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Closing the Tax Gap: Encouraging Voluntary
Compliance Through Mass-Media Publication
of High-Profile Tax Issues
ELIZABETH BRANHAM*

INTRODUCTION

Taxes and tax policies affect every American, young and old, rich
and poor. Because of their pervasive effect, it is only natural that in a
world increasingly consumed by celebrity obsession, important issues
arising from celebrity tax evasion, whether criminal or not, are brought
to the fore. Recently, this has been true of well-known individuals such
as Wesley Snipes, Joe Francis, and Richard Hatch.' However, the
publication of high-profile tax prosecutions is not a new phenomenon. In
the 1920S the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) prosecuted Al Capone; in
the197os Vice President Spiro Agnew faced tax evasion charges; and in
the i98os Leona Helmsley was forced to spend time in jail for tax
evasion! The difference between modem tax evaders and those of the
late 9oos is that in the last two decades, the rise of the Internet and
celebrity gossip magazines has made celebrities both more visible and
more obvious embodiments of social values and norms. In an
environment of loose morals and perceived legal privilege, this is
potentially problematic. However, in the context of tax policy, the
visibility of celebrities can be used to the IRS's advantage.
The American tax system is almost wholly dependent on taxpayers
choosing to file returns and accurately reporting their income. The IRS
receives over 1.5 billion returns per year3 but performs audits on less than
I% of those returns.4 Therefore, at the end of the day, it is up to the
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2oo9; B.A., University
of California, Los Angeles.
I. See Stephanie Fontanez, Tax-Troubled Celebrities, Politicians, Outlaws, CNN.coM, Apr. 15,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2oo8JLlVING/wayoflife/o4115/famous.tax/index.html.
2. See id.
3. OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR
REDUCING THE TAX GAP 9 (20o6).
4. See id. at 12-13. In 2005, the IRS sent 3.2 million notices to taxpayers who made clerical
errors and 3.5 million notices to taxpayers who either underreported or failed to file a return. Id. at 13.
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individual taxpayer to choose either to file or to evade. That choice, as
studies have shown, is influenced by a number of factors, including the
individual taxpayer's fear of punishment and reaction to social norms
and values.'
To the extent that norms and other nonpecuniary elements factor
into a taxpayer's decision to comply with or evade taxes, mass media and
celebrities, as embodiments and reflections of social values and norms,
may aid in the enforcement efforts of the IRS. As discussed in further
detail below, when coupled with threat of punishment, this tactic can
have a two-pronged effect on compliance.6 On the one hand, publication
of high-profile prosecutions informs and reinforces social norms in favor
of compliance by signaling social disapproval of evaders. On the other
hand, the fact that even celebrities and other famous people are readily
prosecuted buttresses the IRS's enforcement measures by emphasizing
the idea that no taxpayer is immune or exempt from his tax obligations.
As examined below, publicity surrounding high-profile tax issues has the
further benefit of efficiency.' Where the IRS makes strategic assessments
on who to prosecute and who to settle with, choosing to prosecute trials
implicating high-profile taxpayers will most often result in free
advertisement. Therefore the IRS is able to publicly encourage
enforcement at no added cost.
Part I of this Note provides a brief background on the tax gap,
explaining its implications for compliance and why it is a problem that
must be addressed. This Part also details various methods the IRS has
employed and plans to employ in an effort to close the tax gap. Although
some of those measures have been effective, there is certainly room for
improvement and implementation of more radical approaches to
reducing the gap.
Part II lays a foundation for taxpayer behavior. In order to create
and implement effective procedures, it is imperative to understand how
the taxpayer thinks about the Internal Revenue Code ("the Code").
Furthermore, in a heterogeneous society, there are a variety of taxpayer
types, and understanding their motivations can be valuable in structuring
compliance methodologies to appeal to more than one group at a time.
Part III examines the effect of the media on taxpayer attitudes
through a comparison to the effect of mass media on the electoral
process.
Finally, Part IV lays out the approach proposed above in more
detail. Combining taxpayer attitudes and the effect of the media on
However, only 1.2 million returns were individually examined. Id.
5. See infra Part II.C.3.
6. See infra Part W.B.
7. See infra Part IV.B. 3 .
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behavior, the mass-media approach suggests that the IRS should utilize
media publicity to its advantage in altering taxpayer attitudes toward
voluntary compliance by prosecuting high-profile individuals. This
approach has great potential for influencing taxpayer attitudes and
persuading them to want to comply.

I.

THE TAX GAP PROBLEM

This Part provides background on the tax gap. Specifically, it
addresses why the gap is a problem and the role of voluntary compliance
in the system. It suggests that to the extent voluntary compliance is one
way to close the gap, the tax policy of the IRS as expressed in the Code is
a key element. This Part concludes with a discussion of measures
employed by the IRS to close the gap.
A.

WHAT

IS THE TAX

GAP, AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?

Each year, the IRS estimates the amount of the gross tax gap in
order to gauge compliance.8 The tax gap measures the difference
between the amount of projected revenue from federal income tax
dollars and the amount actually collected.9 In 2001, the IRS estimated
that the gross tax gap was between $312 and $353 billion.'° In the same
year, within the tax gap, underreporting of individual income tax
represented 71% of the overall tax gap," and the highest proportion of
noncompliant taxpayers were those not subject to third-party reporting.'2
Where taxpayers are not subject to third-party reporting of wages, they
have increased discretion to underreport income which, along with
overstatement of deductions, are the two most common forms of
noncompliant behavior. 3 This emphasizes the role of voluntary
compliance in efforts to close the tax gap.
Why is the tax gap a problem? The government's gross revenue in
2006 exceeded $2.4 trillion. 4 Within such unimaginable amounts, the IRS
generates approximately 95% of the revenue through collection of
income, transfer, and excise taxes.'5 Further broken down, federal
8. IRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, UNDERSTANDING THE TAX GAP (2005), http://ftp.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/o,,id=137246,oo.html.
9. Id.
1o. Id. This number does not include amounts collected late or through IRS enforcement efforts.
Those included, the tax gap was between $257 and $298 billion. Id.
I I. IRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 12 (2007), availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax-gap-report-fmalo802o7linked.pdf.
12. Id.
13. YANKELOVICH, SKELLY & WHITE, INC., TAXPAYER ATrITUDES STUDY: FINAL REPORT (1984).

These forms of noncompliant activity constituted as much as 8o% of the gross tax gap in 2o0i. See
OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 3, at 6.
14. IRS, supra note Is, at I.
15. See id.
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income tax is the primary source of all tax revenue collected by the IRS.' 6
The tax gap represents the loss of revenue and corresponding decrease in
federal funds to spread through federal aid and other public benefit
programs. Although it is unlikely that individuals will, as a group, stop
paying taxes altogether, increased evasion increases the tax gap. Should
evasion replace the current norm of compliance, the decrease in
compliance could have drastic implications for the federal government.
The federal government relies on revenue to pay its international debt,
provide for its citizens through Medicare, social security, and other
welfare plans, and provide for the general defense of the nation.'7
Without income, each of those activities would be impossible, leaving the
government crippled and useless. Currently, the tax gap presents
problems because the loss of revenue represents a decrease in the
amount of overall federal revenue and, therefore, less money to be
spread around through federal aid and other public benefit programs.
Although it is unlikely that individuals will, as a group, stop paying taxes
altogether, increased evasion increases the tax gap.
Furthermore, evasion by one taxpayer simply places the burden of
decreased revenue onto other taxpayers. The decreased revenue could
lead the government to raise tax rates in order to generate the income
needed to operate the federal system. This shifts the burden from the
noncompliant taxpayer to the honest and compliant taxpayer, who is
then punished by higher rates for choosing to be a responsible member
of society. In terms of fairness alone, the tax gap represents a valid
concern for regulators seeking to make the administration of the federal
income tax an equitable system. Therefore, goals for achieving
compliance in filing tax returns and reporting income are paramount to
the success and workability of the federal government.' 8
B.

IRS EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE TAX GAP
The IRS has, since its inception, made an effort to encourage
compliance and close the tax gap. The IRS has approached the problem
from different perspectives. One measure is the withholding of wage and
salary tax. 9 Since 1954, certain employers have been required to remit
payment of taxes on personal individual income of their employees
directly to the IRS.2" The taxpayer then files a return and may potentially
16. In 2007, personal income tax constituted 45% of all federal revenue. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON

(2oo8).
17. Budget of the United States Government: Browse Fiscal Year 2009, http//www.gpoaccess.gov/
usbudget/fyo9/browse.html.
i8. The IRS has stated that it is committed to using aggressive strategies in an effort to close the

TAXATION, IIOTH CONG., OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECr FOR 2008, at 16

tax gap. OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 3, at 2.
19. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKUA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER
TAXES i8 (2004).

20. I.R.C. § 3402 (2oo6).
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recover some of the taxes paid on his behalf to the IRS. By instituting the
withholding program, the IRS eliminated the possibility of
underreporting income for wage earners.' In 2006, over 68% of personal
income tax was collected in this manner.2 As an enforcement measure to
close the tax gap, mandatory withholding and third-party reporting of
wages by the employer have been successful. 3

Another attempt to decrease the tax gap began in the late 1990s,
when the IRS decided to give itself a makeover and become the "kinder,
friendlier IRS."' This move was motivated by the fact that taxpayers felt
the IRS was too intrusive and was treating taxpayers unfairly, but that if
they thought the opposite, taxpayers would be less likely to feel that they
won something by cheating the IRS out of their tax dollars. 5 If people
think well of the IRS, it is no longer the big bad monster stealing their
money and then punishing them for trying to save a few tax dollars. In
addition, the IRS created a better system of customer service. 6 The
result was a resource for the taxpayer who failed to voluntarily comply
because the forms were too complicated or who did not understand his
tax obligations. 7
As part of this initiative, Congress shifted the burden of proof in tax
cases from the taxpayer to the IRS and enhanced customer service. 8 A
side effect of the "kinder" IRS was a corresponding decrease in
enforcement activity.29 Tax scholars claim that the decline in enforcement
was a temporary result of the diversion of resources to re-organizational
efforts, and also note that there are dangers in decreased enforcement.30

21.

LINDA

E.

STIFF ET AL.,

U.S.

DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,

IRS

DATA BOOK, 2007,

at 33

(2007),

availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/o7databkrevised.pdf.
22. See id. at 3 tbl.i. The plan for the new "kinder, friendlier" IRS was characterized by a focus

on customer service and creating an open and accessible face for the Service.

SLEMROD & BAKIJA,

supra

note 19, at 183.
23. See IRS, supra note II.For amounts subject to third-party reporting and withholding, the net
amount of income misreported in 2001 was 1.2%. Id. For amounts subject to third-party reporting, but
not withholding misreporting, the net amount of income misreported was slightly higher, at 4.5%. Id.
Not surprisingly, misreporting of amounts not subject to third-party reporting or withholding was
53.9%. Id.
24. SLEMROD & BAKUA, supra note 19, at 183. In fact, customer service has remained a goal of the
IRS through the present. See IRS, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, STRATEGIC PLAN 2005-2009, at 3-4 (2007),
availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-ut/strategic-plan-o5-o9.pdf.
25. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 19, at 183.

26. Id. at 184.

27. See IRS, supra note 24, at 12. Since 1999, satisfaction rates have increased from approximately
38% to nearly 6o% Id.
28. SLEMROD & BAKLUA,supra note i9, at 183.

29. Id. In 1999, 126o tax investigations resulted in indictment. IRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
ENFORCEMENT

STATISTICS -CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATION

(CI)

30. See SLEMROD &BAKIA, supra note 19, at 184.

STRATEGY (2008), http://
By 2002, that number dropped to

ENFORCEMENT

www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcementlarticle/o,,id=io8792,oo.html.
only 954. Id.
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Where the likelihood of being subjected to an audit declines, balancing
the risks and monetary benefits of evasion weighs heavier on the side of
evasion. As a result, there has been some movement in recent years
toward a sterner IRS with a harder enforcement line.3' The benefits of
this tactic to induce compliance has, therefore, had mixed results.
Although taxpayers appreciate that the IRS has improved customer
service and is more willing to explain the complex ins and outs of filing a
return, decreased enforcement may have mitigated any benefit.32
More recently, the IRS has decided to aggressively pursue the goal
of voluntary compliance.33 Proposed measures include increasing
transparency of reporting in order to make evasion more difficult,
enhancing taxpayer services, reforming and simplifying the law, and
continuing to improve information technology to better detect deficient
returns.3" By simplifying the Code, the IRS has made it easier for
taxpayers who are not opposed to paying taxes to do so. And by
improving technology to detect deficient returns, the IRS is better able to
collect income tax from individuals who did not completely comply in
their income reporting. This means that individuals who made mistakes
or innocently failed to comply will be notified of their deficiencies and
able to correct them on future returns. Taxpayers who opportunistically
underreported or overstated their deductions will be on notice that the
IRS is aware of their actions. Additionally, the threat of audit for further
noncompliant behavior should deter noncompliant taxpayers from
continuing in opportunistic evasion. Overall, these are all laudable public
tools to increase compliance. However, to really boost voluntary
compliance, the IRS must persuade taxpayers that they want to comply.
Taxpayers may choose to comply because they fear punishment, are
conditioned to comply through education and social circumstances, or
because they are led to believe that compliance is a civic duty. Why they
comply is not as important as the fact that the end product of the IRS's
efforts is a taxpayer who does not need to be strong-armed into filing a
correct return.
Therefore, in addition to using more public measures, the IRS must
to some extent engage in a campaign of public persuasion. As discussed
in more detail in Part IV, by strategically choosing to pursue high-profile
individuals once their returns have come up through the audit system,
knowing that such people are already subject to intense media scrutiny,
the IRS can directly influence taxpayer behavior through the mass-media
reporting of such prosecutions.
31. See IRS, supra note 24, at 3. This is exemplified by the
"Service + Enforcement = Compliance." Id.
32. Id.
33. OFFICE oF TAX PoLIcy, supra note 3, at 1-4.
34. Id.

2005-2009

Strategic Plans' motto of
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II. WHY Do TAXPAYERS CHOOSE TO FILE RATHER THAN EVADE?
Voluntary compliance comes down to a choice on the part of the
taxpayer to either accurately report her tax liability or to partially or
wholly evade. Therefore, it is important to understand taxpayer
motivations. In a heterogeneous society, individual taxpayers will have
different, although sometimes overlapping, motivations. This Part
considers various scholarly theories on taxpayer motivation, concluding
that non-economic factors such as norms and social values may have the
greatest impact on the decision to comply or evade.
A.

ECONOMIC THEORIES OF TAX COMPLIANCE

By far the most popular and widely examined model for taxpayer
behavior is the traditional economic model.35 This model essentially
states that taxpayer behavior can be explained in purely economic
terms. 6 According to the economic model, a taxpayer's decision to
comply is a result of balancing the risk of detection and punishment with
the economic benefit derived from evading the tax.37 This approach is
essentially the "tax evasion gamble," whereby the taxpayer seeks to
maximize profits while simultaneously avoiding punishment. 8 The
implied basis for the tax evasion gamble is the risk of punishment.
Therefore, an increase in enforcement, by either performing more audits
per year or instituting more severe punishments, should result in a
corresponding increase in voluntary compliance.39 Where the risk of
punishment is high, the balance of economic benefit will almost always
be outweighed, especially when the economic benefit is slight, as with
marginal taxpayers.'
The economic model is flawed. Since there has been decreased
enforcement over the past decade, 4 and since the risk of audit is about
I%, 4 one would expect a decrease in voluntary compliance. However,

the average rate of voluntary compliance was as high as 86% in 200i. 4"
The only explanation for this discrepancy is that there are factors not
included in the gamble that influence a taxpayer's decision to comply or

35. See, e.g., James R. Aim, Administrative Options to Close the Tax Gap, 117 TAX NOTES 495,
495-96 (2007).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 495.
38. Id. For a mathematical explanation of the mechanics of the gamble, see id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See supra note 29.
42. IRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FISCAL YEAR 2007 IRS ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE
STATISTICS 3 (2oo9), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/irsenforcementandservice_
tablesfy_2007.pdf
43. OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 3, at 2.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6o:1507

evade.' Such factors may include demographics, social values, and norms
of compliance. 5
B.

TYPES OF TAXPAYERS AND THEIR MOTIVATIONS

In 1984, the IRS commissioned a comprehensive study on taxpayer
attitudes and motivations ("the 1984 study"). 46 The study included an
examination of social values and demographic information as factors
influencing taxpayer attitudes toward cheating and voluntary
compliance.47 In grouping taxpayers according to their attitudes toward
cheating, the study came up with five categories of taxpayers: strong
compliers, the silent majority, rationalizers, scramblers, and the strategic
noncompliers. 4s Each of the groups comprises anywhere from I6% to
23% of the overall taxpayer universe.49
"Strong compliers" are those taxpayers who are "philosophically
opposed to all forms of and rationales for tax cheating."5 The "silent
majority" are those taxpayers who are generally opposed to cheating, but
who are not as strongly against it as the strong compliers.' The
"rationalizers" are those who admit to cheating more often than the
strong compliers and the silent majority, and who do not have a problem
with most justifications for cheating."2 The "scramblers" are the taxpayers
who are the most likely of the preceding groups to admit cheating. 3 They
evade primarily by not reporting cash and other outside income.' Unlike

44. Id. at 2. While the rate of compliance may be flawed because it is estimated from the tax gap,
wherein not all cheaters were caught, it must be considered a close estimate. The 86% figure
represents the gross rate of compliance, including income recovered by the IRS through prosecutions
and corrected returns. Id.
45. Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1459 (2003).
46. YANKELOVICH, SKELLY & WHITE, INC., supra note 13. The final report from this study was the
result of the opinions of twenty focus groups led by a moderator and the in-person interview of 2200
taxpayers nationwide. Id. at i. The 1984 study is, unfortunately, the most recent study of the same size
and scope conducted on taxpayer attitudes. To the extent that taxpayers studied in 1984 are now a full
generation older, and significant changes to general tax rates have been enacted, an updated study
would be beneficial in understanding current taxpayer attitudes.
47. Id. at 69.
48. Id. The study based the creation of these categories on an assessment of responses to thirteen
attitudinal variables including flexible honesty, skepticism about human integrity, belief in beating the
system, sympathy for tax protesters, patriotism versus self-interest, perceived honesty and fairness of
the IRS, omnipotence of the IRS, strong fear of getting caught, belief that the tax system is too
complex, objections to government spending, feelings of disenfranchisement, overall effectiveness of
the IRS, and belief that the tax system is generally unfair. Id. at 56-58.
49. Id. at 69.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.

53- Id.
54- Id.
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the previous groups, they do not justify their noncompliant behavior.5
The "strategic noncompliers" include tax protesters and other individuals
who refuse to pay taxes and subscribe to a range of rationalizations for
cheating.: For the purposes of this Note, the five groups will be
combined into three larger groups: the "compliant taxpayers" who,
absent innocent mistake, comply; the "marginal taxpayers" who cheat to
varying degrees where and when the opportunity arises (this includes the
silent majority, the rationalizers, and the scramblers); and the
"noncompliant taxpayers" who generally refuse on principle to file
returns or otherwise comply with the tax system.
Of these groups, the largest by far is the marginal taxpayers57 who,
unlike the compliant and noncompliant taxpayers, do not take a hard line
on any rationale. t Most are amenable to cheating when and where the
opportunity arises.59 Within this group, the most common noncompliant
activities include underreporting income and overstating deductions.6
These taxpayers cheat in small ways primarily with small amounts of
money; they are opportunistic cheaters. Their primary justifications are
based on the widely held perception that a good proportion of the
population cheats on their taxes.6' These characteristics combine to make
a group that is highly influenced by their perception of other taxpayer
behavior. As such, they are the most susceptible to an IRS program
focused on adjusting taxpayer attitudes. Because they are not
ideologically or philosophically determined to cheat or to comply, their
attitude is flexible and can be manipulated based on social values and
other factors.
C.

NON-ECONOMIC FACTORS INFLUENCING TAX COMPLIANCE

i.

Demographics

The 1984 study examined the role of demographics in taxpayer
attitudes. The demographic characteristics considered included age, race,
gender, education, occupation, and income, among others." The 1984
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
6o. Id. at 29-31. Underreporting constituted 29% of reported evasion and overstating deductions
25% of reported noncompliant activity. Id. at 31.
6I. Taxpayers admitting to noncompliant activity report that they are not "veteran" cheaters. Id.
at 33. About two-thirds claim to only have cheated once or twice (or, in other words, as the
opportunity arose). See id.
62. Id. at 34. The 1984 study found that taxpayer perception of cheating was that approximately
41% of the population engages in noncompliant behavior. Id. at 30. In fact, only about 59% of
taxpayers actually report having cheated on their returns, which is less than half of the perceived rate
of noncompliance. Id.
63. Id. at 55. Other demographic factors included length of time in the neighborhood, previous
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study found that in terms of attitudinal variables, 64 one demographic
group stands out. That group includes taxpayers under the age of twentyfive who earn $25,000 or more. 65 That group is the most willing to engage
in questionably noncompliant behavior and is less fearful of the IRS and
punishment. 6 That being said, the study also found that, taken together,
demographic variables as compared with reported behavior account for
less than 5% of variance in behavior. 67 Furthermore, compared with
attitudinal variables used in assigning the five categories of taxpayers,
demographic factors have little to no effect. 68 Therefore, while
demographics may influence a taxpayer's attitudes toward cheating and
the acceptability of noncompliant behavior, those same factors have little
actual effect on the taxpayer's decision to comply once classified within
the appropriate taxpayer group.
2.
Social Values
The i984 study further examined the effects of social values on
taxpayer compliance. The two most influential social values were those
supporting a fluid definition of honesty and reflecting "cynicism about
the human condition." 69 Flexible honesty refers to a willingness to stretch
the truth in order to receive personal financial gain as long as the other
party is an institutional player.7' Cynicism about the human condition,
with respect to taxes, is the idea that most Americans cheat on their taxes
and that the only people who fail to cheat are those who had no
opportunity to do so.7' Overall, taxpayers' social values were found to be
"fundamental" to the question of compliance.72
It is important to note that, implicit in the two social values
identified by the study, there are other social values at work. For
instance, within the definition of honesty is the idea of whether it is
wrong, not wrong, or right to cheat on taxes. Those with a flexible
definition of honesty would say that it is "not wrong" to engage in some
audit experience, marital status, use of a tax-preparer, opportunity, self-employed status, and type of
tax form used. Id.
64. See supra note 48 for a list of attitudinal variables considered in the 1984 study.
65. YANKELOVICH, SKELLY & WHrTE, INc., supranote 13, at 17, 103-29.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 61-63.
68. Id.
69. Id. The 1984 study also considered the social value of "beat[ing] the system." Id. at 11O-12.
Individuals adhering to this particular value espouse the idea that it is "fun" to get around the law and
cheat the government. Id. This attitude is generally associated with a loss of faith in our system of
government. Id. This value is not relevant to this paper because, as the 1984 study found, the value is
accepted and adhered to only by noncompliant taxpayers. Id.
70. Id. at io7-o8. This was determined in the study by asking questions about the acceptability of
stretching an insurance claim or keeping money accidentally given as change at a department store. Id.
71. Id. Lack of opportunity generally results from not having any nonsalary or wage income that
might avoid third-party reporting. Id.
72. Id. at 63.
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level of noncompliant behavior. Such individuals are those at issue in this
Note, the marginal taxpayers who do not feel strongly either way about
the moral character of a taxpayer who fails to comply. Additionally,
within the idea of cynicism is the value of conformity. If other people do
not comply, then you are conforming to a social standard of flexible
honesty by deliberately evading taxes yourself.
3. Social Norms
Finally, in addition to social values, it has been widely suggested in
scholarly literature that social norms play some part in influencing
compliant behavior.73 Social norms are closely linked to social values and
may even reflect the same idea; however, they are distinct concepts. Both
norms and values inform human behavior. Norms are generally
entrenched in our value system and become akin to social laws, although
they do not depend on the government for formal promulgation or
enforcement. 4 Instead, norms are created through the emergence of a
consensus among the public at large. For instance, there exists a norm
against stealing. Everyone knows that, under most circumstances, taking
something that does not belong to you is wrong.75 The fact that there is a
corresponding law has little influence on the effectiveness of the norm.
Individuals who choose to steal are generally looked down upon as
thieves, are viewed to be dishonest, and, to some extent, are shunned. As
a result, unless and until the norm against stealing changes in the context
of individualized, unjustified stealing, the absence of legal criminal
sanctions would not result in an increase in the instances of thievery.
The violation of a norm is generally associated with particular
nonpecuniary sanctions including, most importantly, guilt and shame. 76
Guilt and shame are closely related in that they are both products of
formal and informal education.' The difference between the two is that
where guilt is internal, shame is external." Guilt relies only on the
offender's internalized values and the knowledge that his action was
wrong.79 Shame, however, requires that others know that the offender

73. See IRS, supra note 8; Lederman, supra note 45, at 146o-61; Richard A. Posner & Eric B.
Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT'L Rev. L. &
EcON. 369, 370 (1999); Joshua D. Rosenberg, Narrowing the Tax Gap: Behavioral Options, 117 TAx
NOTES 517, 517-18 (2007).
74. Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 73, at 369.
75. There are of course always exceptions to the general rule, such as looting during a riot when
the riot mentality condones opportunistic stealing.
76. Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 73, at 371. Other sanctions include automatic sanctions,
informational sanctions, bilateral costly sanctions, and multilateral costly sanctions, which will not be
discussed in this Note. See id. at 371-72
77. Id. at 373-74. Informal schooling includes upbringing, intentional moral influence of parents
and relatives, and the examples of peers and other adults. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 373.
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has acted in violation of the norm for punishment." This is perhaps the
more important sanction with respect to norms since, as in the case of the
noncompliant tax return, the offender will not be sanctioned unless those
who know the offender find out that he cheated on his taxes. Since
returns are largely confidential, society is not likely to obtain such
information unless the offender brags about it."' A norm enforced only
by shame may therefore be ineffective in the realm of tax policy since it
encourages violation of the norm if the offender does not believe she will
be caught."
Because norms are generally created through the gradual formation
of consensus, they are mutable." They can be changed gradually through
the standardization of a new norm or the reinforcement of an existing
norm."' However, the process of reformation can be slow and difficult.
This is especially true of norms enforced through shame and guilt. 86Such
norms are the product of social conditioning, instilled in the individual by
parents throughout the developmental process.8' Therefore, they tend to
be strongly rooted in the attitudes and values of the individual.
Norms are potentially extremely influential in the creation of a
voluntarily compliant population because, for the most part, they interact
well with laws and government.f The government can also help to create
or reinforce norms."' For example, the California Franchise Tax Board,
California's taxing authority, maintains a list of taxpayers who owe back
taxes.' When an individual's name appears on the list, the agency is
providing the public with the information necessary for the shame
sanction to be effective. For a norm primarily enforced through guilt and
shame, the government can reinforce the norm by providing sources of
education on compliance and demonstrate that the norm is actual

8o. Id. at 374.
81. With respect to state and local tax returns, many states have enacted provisions requiring the
state's Department of Taxation (or the equivalent) to publish a list of delinquent taxpayers. Each state
has different requirements with respect to the information publicly disclosed and for the types of
delinquencies listed, which may limit the efficacy of the list as a shaming tactic. For instance, California
only publishes the names of the 250 taxpayers who owe the most money. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 19195 (West Supp. 2009). For examples of other state statutes requiring publication of delinquent
taxpayer lists, see generally COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-35-117 (20O8); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 30, § 359(b)
(1997); FLA. STAT. § 197.413 (20O8); VA. CODE. ANN. § 58.1-3 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 82.32.330
(20O8); and WiS. STAT. § 73.03(62) (2OO7).
82. See Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 73, at 374.
83. Id. at 377.
84. Id. at 377-78.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 379.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 38o.
89. Id.
9o. See supranote 81.
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compliance and not evasion.' Through education, the government
creates the basis for guilt and shame once the individual has violated the
norm.92 Finally, the government certainly plays a large role in combating
bad norms.93 To the extent that the taxpayers perceive the norm to be
one of evasion rather than cooperation and compliance, by punishing
noncompliant taxpayers, the government is battling the norm of
evasion.' 4 It does so by decreasing the benefit of complying with such
"bad" norms by providing legal remedies and sanctions.9' The
government can thus directly influence behavior. By showing people
what they are supposed to think about compliance, through education
and in reinforcing good norms and then punishing conformity with bad
norms, the taxing authority is altering behavior through influence on
norms.
Judge Richard Posner and Professor Eric Rasmusen doubt whether
government influence of norms is efficient and effective, suggesting that
sometimes it is better if government simply steps away, allowing private
creation and enforcement of norms to proceed. 6 However, their primary
goal is to suggest that if government cannot be completely left out,
government regulation can supplement good norms and regulate bad
norms.7 Of course, it is important to note that norms alone cannot
regulate behavior and enforce order. 8 Nonetheless, legal sanctions for
violations of norms, like in the stealing example above, can be important.
When considering the fact that there are five different types of taxpayers
constituting a heterogeneous population, some enforcement tactics will
work better on some types than others. For noncompliant taxpayers,
legal sanctions are important because with respect to tax compliance,
they are unaffected by norms of cooperation.' These people may lack
guilt and shame and may not care what other people think of them.
However, they are not exempt from the "law's tangible sanctions. ''"" °
III. MASS-MEDIA'S EFFECT ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR

This Part considers the effect of mass media on human behavior. It
discusses mass media not only through demonstrations of social values
on television, but also from the perspective of marketing strategies. This
Part concludes that, as demonstrated through anecdotal evidence, what
91. Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 73, at 38o-81.
92.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
ioo.

Id. at 380.
Id.
See id. at 38o-81.
Id. at 381-82.
Id. at 382.
Id.
Id. at 380.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
Id.
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people see in the media affects not only behavior, but also instills social
values and potential norms as well.
A.

CASE STUDIES FOR THE INFLUENCE OF MASS MEDIA ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR

Most lay people acknowledge the existence of the media effect.
Through anecdotal evidence from school shootings and violence in
children, for example, it is widely accepted that because of its pervasive
nature, the mass media has an effect on social values and human
behavior.'' There have been a number of studies indicating through
anecdotal and empirical evidence that mass media affects the way
individuals view their environment and the way they behave as a result. 2
Within the legal field, the most compelling case of mass-media
influence on attitudes and behavior comes from a study of the effect of
television judges on citizens participating in jury trials."° The study
focused on syndicated television courtroom programs because they are
the most popular reality legal shows.0 4 The study found that, in general,
individuals begin with a limited understanding of judges and the roles
they are supposed to play.' 5 As a result, mass-media courtroom reality
programs inform the public's understanding of how the judge is supposed
to behave.' ° Many jurors who were frequent viewers of courtroom
reality programs reported that they tended to look to the judge for clues
as to his opinion of the case and to interpret the judge's silence as
indicating belief in one of the litigants."° The study concludes with the
suggestion that reality courtrooms on television should make an effort to
reflect the reality of the courtroom, showing impartial instead of
tyrannical and rude judges.' To do so would perhaps have a positive
effect on the overall opinion of the fairness and equity of the America
legal system."
Outside of the legal arena, the most striking example of mass
media's effect on human behavior arises in the context of anti-smoking
campaigns. Since the I96os, the U.S. government has used mass media to

ioi. A.O. Scott, Drawing a Line From Movie to Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo7/o4/23/movies/23movi.html.

23,

2007, at Ei,

102. See generally Byoungkwan Lee et al., The Effects of Information Sources on Consumer
Reactions to Direct-To-Consumer (DTC) PrescriptionDrug Advertising, 36 J. ADVERTISING 107 (2oo7);

Kimerlianne Podlas, Please Adjust Your Signal: How Television's Syndicated Courtrooms Bias Our

Juror Citizenry, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. I

(2001);

Cheryl B. Preston, Baby Spice: Lost Between Feminine and

Feminist, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 541
103. See Podlas, supra note 102, at 2.
104. Id. at i.
105. Id. at 15.
Io6. Id.
107. Id. at 2.
io8. Id. at 22.

iO9. Id.

(2001).
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broadcast a general campaign against smoking."' In i988, California
voters passed Proposition 99, a tax on tobacco products, the proceeds of
which would be used to fund activities promoting health and tobaccocontrol activities."' Beginning in 199o and I991, California spent $28
million on an antismoking media campaign." ' During the same time,
cigarette consumption was 802 million packs lower than estimates based
on pre-Proposition 99 historical trends."3 This marked a sharper decline
in cigarette consumption in California compared to national numbers,
despite similar price increases nationwide."4
The influence of mass media on consumer behavior is well
recognized within the arena of marketing."5 Research on the interplay
between advertising and attitudes indicate that there is a positive
relationship between the two."6 Such a relationship results from the
nature of mass media as a form of consumer socialization,"7 the process
through which individuals learn the "skills, knowledge, and attitudes" to
function as consumers.",8 As a socializing mechanism, mass-media
advertising plays a role in conveying consumer norms, values, and
behavior to individuals." 9 Furthermore, this consumer socializing is not
limited to an individual's childhood and developmental years, but, rather,
extends throughout the individual's lifecycle.' ° To the extent that mass
media does act as a mirror for social values, "it alternately functions as
an instrument for social change and a tool for restabilizing... the status
quo"' at all stages of life.
For example, the portrayal of women and their relationship to men
in fashion and other advertisements affects subconscious understanding
i lo. Encyclopedia of Public Health, Mass Media and Tobacco Control, http://www.enotes.com/
public-health-encyclopedia/mass-media-tobacco-contro (last visited June TO,2009).
III. Proposition 99, also known as the "Tobacco Tax and Health Protection Act of 1988," is
codified at CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 30121-30130 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009). The full text of
Proposition 99 is available online at http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/tobacco/Documentsl
CTCPProp991nitiative.pdf.
I12. Stanton A Glantz, Changes in Cigarette Consumption, Prices, and Tobacco Industry Revenues
Associated with California's Proposition 99, TOBACCO CoNrTROL, Dec. 1993, at 311, 313, available at
http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/cgi/reprint/2/4/31I.pdf.
113. Id.
I14. Id. at 314.
115. See Lee et al., supra note 102, at iso (stating that where "attitudes toward advertising have

been" extensively researched, findings show a positive relationship between attitude and behavioral
response).
116. See id.
117. Seeid. at I15.

118. See id. at lo8, 115.
II9. Seeid. at io8.
120. See id.

121. Preston, supra note 102, at 549 (quoting Susan Bisom-Rapp, Introduction to Chapter II:
Feminism, Law, and Popular Culture, in FEMINISM, MEDIA, AND THE LAW 87, 87 (Martha A. Fineman &
Martha T. McCluskey eds., 1997)).
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of an individual's gender role within society."'2 While women are
continuously portrayed in vulnerable group poses, such as sleeping or
giggling with girlfriends, males are portrayed as dominant and
independent.' This leads to the creation of different body stereotypes
between men and women.'" Where men view their bodies "as a means of
achieving mastery over the external environment,' 25 women view the
main purpose of their body as a means to "attract others....2. These
stereotypes are reinforced throughout an individual's life through
advertisements separately targeting children, adolescents, and adults,
thus affecting individual and group attitudes toward, and social values in
relation to, gender roles.'27
B.

FREE-ADVERTISING MARKETING STRATEGIES

As discussed above, marketing has an effect on the attitudes and
behavior of individuals by acting as a socializing mechanism. Therefore,
strategic placement can affect the utility of the advertisement in its role
as a socializer. Nontraditional strategies include product placement,
capturing people in "bottlenecks,"'2 9 and the use of Internet outlets.'30 In
the context of political campaigns, television remains the primary media
outlet for advertisement.' A recent poll regarding the 2008 presidential
campaign reported that 56% of respondents had seen an ad on television
for the candidates, 51% had watched televised debates or news coverage
of the debates, and 40% had seen the candidates on talk shows or other
television programming.'
A study conducted on the 2000 electoral campaign between Al Gore
and George W. Bush found that the marketing strategies of the
candidates certainly took into account the value of free media.'33 In terms
122. See id. at 551-58.
123. See id. at 570-71.

124. See id. at 571125. See id. (quoting Stephen L. Franzoi & Mary E. Herzog, Judging Physical Attractiveness: What
Body Aspects Do We Use?, 13 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 19,30 (1987)).
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Lee et al., supra note 102, at 116.
129. Bottlenecks include places where people are trapped for some amount of time and are
therefore involuntarily subjected to advertising. See Paul F. Nunes & Jeffrey Merrihue, The
Continuing Power of Mass Advertising, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter 2007, at 63,64-67.
130. See Ken Wheaton, In Politics, Web Surpasses TV for Under-3o Voters, ADVERrISING AGE, Jan.
28, 2008, http://adage.com/campaigntrail/post?article-id=123398. Such outlets include candidate web
pages, social networking media, and blogs. Id.
131. See id.
132. See id. In terms of respondents' interaction with media advertising, 69% said that television
was their primary mode of interaction and 51% said talk shows were their primary mode of
interaction, compared to 28% who named candidate web pages. Id.
133. Michael Hagen, Presidential Campaign Strategy-And Its Effects 1-4 (Jan. 30, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Hastings Law Journal). President George W. Bush's polling
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of actual appearances, candidates weigh the value of an in-person visit
34
with the cost of taking the time and spending the money to visit a state.'
The value of network news was critical because appearances covered by
local news allowed the public to witness and participate in the
appearance regardless of whether they actually attended.'35 Another
factor in balancing is the fact that because small states have fewer
electoral college votes, personal appearances around the state can be
expensive compared to the value of the appearances. 36 Therefore, as a
campaign strategy in small states, candidates prefer short stops, covered
by local media, to extended stays.'37 In this way, they garner the benefit
of free advertising through local coverage without wasting too much time
or money on extensive in-state travel. Furthermore, by choosing local
appearances carefully and submitting to the magnifying effect of media
coverage, candidates raise visibility in a cost-effective manner.
C.

LIMITATIONS ON THE INFLUENCE OF MASS MEDIA ON THE PUBLIC AT LARGE

It is important to note that, although mass media can have an effect
on attitudes and behavior, it is also limited by human interest. 3' News
comes and goes and often becomes lost in the self-interest of daily life.
One day President Bush's drug use is on the cover of every tabloid and
online newspaper.'39 The next day, the public is shocked by Vice
President Gore's slip of the tongue, 4" and outrage over President Bush is
pushed out of sight and out of the public's mind. Specifically, in the
context of the Bush-Gore presidential campaign, breaking news about
Bush's arrest record resulted in a dip in polling for Bush.'4 ' However, as
the shock faded and the news became old news, Bush's popularity in
polling results began to rise again. 4 ' The old news of his arrest was
replaced by new news of this candidate's statements or that candidate's
appearance, which decreased exposure by refocusing attention
elsewhere.
Put in technical terms, the effectiveness of mass media with respect
to long-term changes relies on two factors: the reception factor'43 and the
numbers, which reflect public support, were higher when he was portrayed favorably in the media and
vice versa. See id. at 17-22, 27.
134. See id. at 5, 27.
135. See id. at 5-6, 27.
136. See id. at 4-5, 27.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 22-27.
139. See, e.g., Bush Faces New Round of Drug Questions, CNN.coM, Aug. 20, 1999, http://
www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/i999/o8/2o/president.2ooo/bush.drug/.
140. See, e.g., Chris Suellentrop, Is Al Gore Better Off Today Than He Was Eight Days Ago?,
SLATE, Aug. 21, 2000, http://www.slate.comiid/1oo592s/.
141. See Hagen, supra note 133, at 20.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 23-24.
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yielding factor.' 44 The reception factor is based on the finding that
exposure is a necessary condition for individuals to receive a message
through mass-media outlets.'45 Receiving the message is in turn a
condition to public persuasion and attitude adjustment. 46 The yielding
factor refers to the fact that repeated exposure builds the individual's
stock of information. 47 The reception factor and the yielding factor are
competing concerns and the importance of one over the other depends
on the context.' 48 With respect to voting, scholars contend that the
individual's stock of information decreases responsiveness to marketing
because it inoculates
the individual to the persuasiveness of the
49
advertisement. 1
Although the pressure of community norms can be influential in an
individual's decision to vote for one candidate over another, choice of
candidate is not a decision into which social values and norms truly
factor. It is neither wrong nor right to vote for one candidate over the
other in the same way that social values may term the decision to file
taxes as wrong or right. Therefore, for the purposes of this Note, it is
more appropriate to focus on the reception factor where exposure of the
issue is key. From that perspective, the persuasiveness of mass media is
limited to exposure.

IV.

THE MASS-MEDIA APPROACH

The following final Part details the mass-media approach to closing
the tax gap. Based on the preceding discussion, it is clear that the tax gap
is a problem in the current system of tax collection, to which increasing
voluntary compliance is potentially the best solution.' Additionally, a
taxpayer's decision to voluntarily comply is largely dependent on his
social values and sanctions based on violation of social norms. Those
social values, as discussed above, have been anecdotally shown to be
affected by mass media, both through advertising, news reporting, and
television shows.' 5 ' Taking all of those social values together, the
following Part discusses the way the mass-media approach operates
within the context of the current system and notes limitations on the
approach.

144. Id. at 24.
145. Id. at 23-24.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 24.
148. Id. at 24-25.
149. Id.
150. See supra Part i.
151. See supra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
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The most effective way to influence behavior is to show people what
to do, make it easy for them to do it, and, at the end, punish
noncompliance and reward cooperation.152 This method contrasts with
the "command model," where, rather than showing people what to do,
the government tells them what to do and enforces behavior with only
punishment.'53 Such an approach is inefficient and ineffective in bringing
about a lasting change in behavior'54 because it is not accompanied by
any effort to change the attitudes and values of individuals, much less
any associated social norm. Where the government threatens punishment
for noncompliant behavior, most will go along because they fear
punishment.'55 However, where the threat of punishment is low or the
punishment itself is not severe, people will continue to disregard the
command.' 56 Take jaywalking tickets, for example. Even if a police
officer were to catch an individual crossing the street against a red light,
it is unlikely that the officer would stop to ticket the individual. And for
most people, the forty-dollar ticket is not a huge deterrent, especially if
that person is in a hurry and knows the likelihood of punishment is low.
In this situation, there is no norm buttressing the government's
command, and therefore the command is generally ineffective because it
fails to alter the individual's attitude toward illegally crossing the street
against a red light.
The mass-media approach is modeled after the Rosenberg approach.
The IRS uses a secret formula to determine which returns to subject to
individual audits.'57 Once the batch of audits is prepared, the IRS has a
choice as to which evasive behavior to prosecute.' s8 Hypothetically, in
2010, the IRS runs its regular audit formula and both Angelina Jolie and
"Average Joe's" returns are audited. Unfortunately for both, there are
problems with their returns and the IRS finds sufficient evidence to
prosecute each for felony tax evasion. At that point, the IRS has a
resource-allocation choice. The IRS can choose to expend the resources
to vigorously prosecute each instance of tax evasion or it can settle out
both violations.'59 The mass-media solution demands that in such a
situation, the IRS allocate resources to the actual prosecution of Ms.
Jolie. By choosing to prosecute Ms. Jolie rather than Mr. Joe, the IRS
ensures media coverage of the prosecution because we are a celebrity-

152. Rosenberg, supra note 73, at 522.
153. Id. This approach will hereinafter be referred to as the "Rosenberg approach."
154. Id.
155. See supra note 5o and accompanying text.
I56. See supranote 5o and accompanying text.
157. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 19, at i8o-8i.
I58. Id.
159. Id.
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centric society.'6' Where Mr. Joe's audit might garner interest within a
limited circle of family and friends, Ms. Jolie's audit and criminal
prosecution is likely to appear on the covers of celebrity tabloids as well
as within serious news periodicals. And as demonstrated by Wesley
Snipes's recent prosecution,' 6' even B-list actors can garner huge
publicity for the IRS.
B.

WHY IS THE MASS-MEDIA APPROACH EFFECTIVE?

The mass-media approach is a two-pronged approach to
enforcement. On the one hand, for those taxpayers who are not affected
by social norms and values, such as the protestors, publicity related to
prosecutions of celebrities and other high-profile individuals sends the
message that no one is exempt from federal income tax obligations. On
the other hand, the approach encourages compliance by reinforcing good
norms and discouraging competing bad norms through the use of actual
legal sanctions. In employing a two-pronged approach, the mass-media
solution addresses all types of marginal taxpayers, providing a multifaceted answer to a heterogeneous taxpayer population.
i. Publicizingthe Universal Threat of Punishment
When the IRS prosecutes a high-profile individual and media outlets
report on the course of the trial, outcome, or sentencing, it draws
attention to the legal punishment for choosing not to comply. By doing
so, the IRS is taking the first step in changing behavior by showing the
public what it is not supposed to do-namely, willfully evade tax
obligations. 62 For strategic, noncompliant taxpayers, this is perhaps the
only way to deter noncompliance. For the rest, however, exposure of
punishment in mass media sends the message that despite the existence
of any sort of dichotomy between the rich and poor, 6' all tax evaders will
be subject to the same punishment, without exception for celebrity,
political power, or wealth. ' Furthermore, by taking a hard line, as in the
i6o. I want to note that in arguing that popular media sources like celebrity gossip columns are
valuable sources of targeted publicity, I do not mean to imply that they are the only or the primary
source of news information available to the public. In fact, even if someone does not read those gossip
columns, celebrity and high-profile-individual reporting appears in most legitimate news sources as
well. This includes such "serious" periodicals as CNN.com, the Los Angeles Times, and the New York
Post.
16i. On October 12, 2006, Wesley Snipes was indicted for conspiracy, tax fraud, and six counts of
tax evasion. See U.S. v. Wesley Snipes: Hollywood Actor Wesley Snipes Indicted on Tax Fraud Charges,

FINDLAw, Oct. 12, 2006, http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/tax/ussnipessot2o6ind.html [hereinafter
U.S. v. Wesley Snipes].
162. See Rosenberg, supra note 73, at 522, 530-31.

163. The perception that there are inequities between the rich and the poor is the most popular
rationale for cheating on taxes. See IRS, supra note i i, at 15.
164. Those who have been prosecuted for tax evasion include Wesley Snipes, a celebrity, Spiro
Agnew, a former Vice President, and Leona Helmsley, a fabulously wealthy socialite. Fontanez, supra
note t.
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Snipes case, the IRS further sends the message through the media that it
takes the problem of noncompliance seriously and that evaders will be
caught and prosecuted.' 6'
In reporting on punishment, mass media also implicitly signals social
values. By focusing on the Wesley Snipes tax evasion and fraud trial,
mass media refuted the idea of flexible honesty as a social value. As
described above, flexible honesty as a value dictates that when it comes
to taxes, it is okay to evade because it does not hurt anyone.'" In
conjunction with a balancing of value and potential for punishment, this
often results in evasion when the opportunity arises. For someone like
Snipes, whose income is not reported by a third party as a wage or salary,
the opportunity for evasion is considerable.' 67 Snipes was nonetheless
held accountable for the total amount of income on which he
opportunistically evaded paying taxes.' In addition to paying back-taxes
and penalties on that amount, Snipes has been sentenced to three years
in prison.' 6 By publicizing his conviction and the corresponding
punishment, mass media is sending the message that flexible honesty is
not an acceptable social value. If a taxpayer ascribes to a flexible
definition of honesty, when caught, he or she will be held liable for any
noncompliant behavior arising therefrom.
2. Buttressing the Existing Norm of Cooperation
As discussed above, social values are reflections of the way that
people think about the world and their interactions with their
community.'70 When the values become so ingrained in the population's
consciousness that they act as social laws, they become norms of
behavior."' By affecting norms, the IRS potentially influences long-term
patterns of behavior just as with California's anti-smoking campaign.
165. Associated Press, Wesley Snipes Receives Three-Year Jail Sentence on Tax Evasion Charges,
Apr. 25, 2008, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/o,2933,35237o,oo.html [hereinafter Snipes
Receives Three- Year JailSentence].
166. See supra notes 69-7o and accompanying text.
167. The government alleged that Snipes failed to pay taxes on the over $12 million he had earned
from the Blade movie trilogy. See Snipes Receives Three-Year Jail Sentence, supra note 165.
168. Mr. Snipes's sentence is currently stayed pending appeal and Mr. Snipes has been released on
bail in the interim. Barbara Liston, Wesley Snipes Gets Bail Pending Appeal in Tax Case, REUTERS UK,
May 23, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/peopleNews/idUKN225343912oo8o523.
169. Although the Snipes conviction was not a clear victory for the IRS since Snipes was found not
guilty of the most serious charges against him, the overall perception in media reporting has been that
he in no way was able to avoid payment of his personal income taxes. See, e.g., Luchina Fisher et al.,
Wesley Snipes Slammed with Three Years in Prison,ABC NEws, Apr. 24, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/
Entertainment/FedCrimes/Story?id=4718482&page=i; Rich Phillips, Snipes Gets the Max-3 YearsIn Tax Case, CNN.coM, Apr. 24, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2oo8/CRIME/o4/24/snipes.sentencingl;
Travis Reed, Wesley Snipes to Serve 3 Years in Prisonfor Tax Convictions, USA TODAY, Apr. 24, 2oo8,
http://www.usatoday.comlife/movies/2oo8-o4-23-64512220-x.htm.
170. See supra Part II.C.2.
171. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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Establishing a norm in favor of compliance and imposition of guilt- and
shame-sanctions encourages individuals to align their behavior with the
norms. In terms of tax compliance, this means an increase in complete
compliance and a decrease in the tax gap.
In the Wesley Snipes case, by claiming to be a victim of poor tax
advice rather than asserting that he did not evade payment of taxes
legitimately due and owing, Snipes signaled acknowledgment that he
violated social values in favor of honest reporting and cooperation.'72
Making this statement was, perhaps, a bid to rehabilitate his reputation
in the face of social sanctions resulting from what the media portrayed as
intentional felony tax evasion. 73 By first portraying Snipes as a potential
felon and then publishing his apology,'74 mass media served as a
reflection of social values by condemning Snipes for violating common
values of cooperation. The public condemnation allowed the application
of shame as a social sanction in addition to the internal guilt sanction.
Snipes's repentance mitigated the effect of social sanctions. By
apologizing, Snipes implicitly acknowledged both the norm and the
punishment. Mass media in that situation played a part in the imposition
of sanctions and, in so doing, buttressed the existing norm of compliance.
By showing that individuals who choose not to act in accordance with the
norm will be punished through the use of nonpecuniary social sanctions,
mass media buttressed the idea of compliance as a socially valuable, or
"good," behavior, and anything else as a violation of social laws.
3. Satisfying Efficiency ConcernsAbout the Most Effective
Allocation of IRS Resources
Because the IRS does not have an unlimited budget, it must be
careful in the allocation of resources. In 2008, the IRS received over 164
million individual income tax returns, 51 million phone calls to its
automated Taxpayer Assistance Center, and over 2 billion page views on
its website.'75 Yet in 2007, the IRS received approximately $1o.5 billion to
run the entire operation, including personnel costs, administration of the
federal income tax, the performance of audits, and the collection of
income tax, both through voluntary compliance and enforcement
172. One popular media source, People Magazine, reported that Snipes claimed to have been
"duped" by his tax advisors into claiming up to $12 million in deductions and credits. See Siobhan
Morrissey, Wesley Snipes Tax Fraud Trial Begins, PEOPLE.COM, Jan. 16, 2008, http://www.people.com/
people/article/o,,2o172o48,oo.html?xid=rss-fullcontentcnn.
173. Based on the allegations, media outlets were reporting that Snipes was facing sixteen years in
prison, listing the maximum possible punishment. See, e.g., id.
174. See Travis Reed, Slammer for Snipes: 36 Months in Prison, HUFFINGTON PosT, Apr. 24, 2oo8,
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2oo8/o4/24/wesley-snipes-sentencing-n98476.html;
Snipes Receives
Three-Year Jail Sentence, supra note 165; Wesley Snipes Gets 3 Years for Not Filing Tax Returns, N.Y
TIrEs.coM, Apr. 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.coM/2oo8/o4/25/business/25snipes.html?.r=i.
175. IRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, IRS DATA BOOK, 2008, at 6 tbl. 3 , 47 tbl.I9 (2008), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soilo8databk.pdf.
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measures.' 76 Compared to a tax gap of $345 billion, $10.5 billion is a
paltry sum. Efficient allocation of resources is understandably a
legitimate concern. In addition to budget concerns, increased efficiency
and decreased costs generally save tax dollars and hopefully contribute
to lower tax rates.
Mass media has a huge reach that is both targeted and specific.
People Magazine has a circulation of 3.75 million readers per week and
targets women from sixteen to forty-five. 7 7 Sports Illustrated, a
periodical targeting young men, has subscriptions at over 3 million per
issue.' Ts Internet sites that are updated periodically throughout the day
have even higher numbers of viewers. For instance, Perezhilton.com is
visited by at least Io.I million unique visitors per month.'79 Dlisted.com, a
blog comparable to Perezhilton.com that also reports on celebrities and
targets young women, gets about 1.2 million hits per month.' 8° The
Huffington Post focuses on political figures appealing to a more
sophisticated audience, and has around four million unique visitors per
month.'8 ' Each of these media outlets has a specific readership and has
the potential to reach segments of the population who do not read
CNN.com or tune into their local news on a daily basis. In a world of
celebrity obsession, readership of periodicals reporting on high-profile
individuals of interest attracts individuals who might not otherwise care
what is going on in traditional news.
Taking the Angelina Jolie and Average Joe hypothetical from above
to its logical conclusion under the mass-media solution means that the
IRS should choose to prosecute Ms. Jolie first. Given the chance, the IRS
will offer to settle identical issues arising from Mr. Joe's noncompliant
behavior as Ms. Jolie, rather than refer Mr. Joe's case to the U.S.
Attorney's office for criminal prosecution. Like a political campaign
manager, the IRS should weigh the value of free media coverage with the
cost of the campaign or, in this case, the prosecution of tax evaders.
Assuming that everything else is equal, Ms. Jolie will garner more
publicity through her celebrity than Mr. Joe will. Nationwide reporting of
Ms. Jolie's tax woes in People Magazine, Perezhilton.com, and the New
York Times, as well as on television, means that the IRS is receiving free
publicity of its enforcement policies and attitude toward tax evasion. In
176. IRS OVERSIGHT BD., FY 2008 IRS BUDGET RECOMMENDATION 3 (2007), available at
http://www.treas.gov/irsob/reports/fy2oo8-budget-report.pdf.
177. See Magazine Publishers of America, http://www.magazine.org/consumer-marketing/circ-trends/
index.aspx (last visited June 1O, 2009) (follow "2o08" hyperlink next to "Magazine Circulation for all
ABC Magazines").
178. See id.
179. The 25 Most Valuable Blogs, 24/7 WALL ST., Mar. 26, 2008, http://www.247wallst.com/2008/o3/
the-twenty-five.html.

18o. Id.
181. Id.
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this way, in the Jolie prosecution, the IRS saves the cost of publicizing
enforcement action.
C.

LIMITATIONS OF THE MASS-MEDIA APPROACH

Despite the potential for huge returns in terms of influencing norms
to encourage people to want to pay their taxes, the mass-media approach
is nonetheless a limited approach to tax compliance. First, although highprofile cases certainly do arise, it is not clear how many occur in a given
year. Since 2000, there have been relatively few reported high-profile
disputes."" As mentioned above, this is in line with the statistics on
voluntary compliance.' 83 However, it limits the IRS's ability to take
advantage of the mass-media approach. Because the approach depends
heavily on the availability of high-profile individuals, IRS prosecutions
will make fewer ripples in the arena of popular mass media in years in
which there are few such individuals. The lack of exposure during those
years affects the IRS's ability to evoke public interest and therefore to
send any sort of message.
Of course, the mass-media solution also depends on the IRS winning
the cases it pursues against high-profile individuals. If the IRS is trying to
send any message to the public through the media, it should be that tax
evaders will be caught and punished. Losing a case has the potential to
send the opposite message. When the IRS loses a case, it can suggest that
its prosecution was overzealous, that evasion within the letter of the law
or tax avoidance is acceptable, or that a taxpayer can "beat the system"
by deliberately evading taxes and then hiring a crack attorney to get him
out of trouble. While such messages may be drawn from an unsuccessful
prosecution, the IRS can avoid them in large part by making careful
assessments of the cases before them. By choosing cases that are open
and shut, the Service lowers its risk of loss and bad publicity. And while
some losses are unavoidable, the IRS can counter bad publicity by
making affirmative public statements with a tax-positive spin.
For instance, Wesley Snipes was acquitted of the most serious
charges levied against him." Some articles covering the outcome of the
trial suggested that the mixed outcome of the trial was a stunning defeat
and a setback in terms of publicized attitudes toward tax compliance.' 5
182. Since 2000, tax evaders mentioned in the news include Boris Becker, Ronald Isley, Luciano
Pavarotti, Martha Stewart, Richard Hatch, Wesley Snipes, and Joe Francis. See Fontanez, supra note
1.

183. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
184. David Cay Johnston, Wesley Snipes Cleared of Serious Tax Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/0202businesslo2tax.htm.
185. See, e.g., id.; Wesley Snipes Acquitted of Federal Tax Fraud, MSNBC.coM, Feb. i, 2008,

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22955757/; Martin Zimmerman, Actor Snipes Acquitted of Tax Fraud,
Guilty of Failingto File a Return, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, availableat http:l/articles.latimes.com/2oo8/

feb/o2/business/fi-snipes2.
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But the defeat referred to is only with respect to the tax-fraud
allegations.18 All articles admit that Snipes was convicted of tax
evasion , ' which is sufficient to meet the IRS's goal of publicizing the

successful prosecution of tax evaders. In fact, a cursory review of the
articles suggests that the majority of the coverage focused on Snipes's
conviction for tax evasion with limited mention of his acquittal for tax
fraud. '88 This largely tax-friendly coverage of the Snipes conviction may
have been influenced by strategic news releases containing positive
statements by the prosecuting attorneys and representatives from the
IRS.' s9

Along the same lines, in implementing the mass-media approach the
IRS must be careful not to allow media coverage to suggest that tax
evasion is common or, on the flip side, that celebrities are being singled
out for harsher treatment. While this problem has no simple solution, the
best response may be for the IRS to continue to manage public
perception through the use of strategic press releases and other public
statements.
Additionally, in implementing the mass-media approach, the IRS
faces a challenge with respect to the potential for additional costs in
prosecuting high-profile individuals. Many of the individuals prosecuted
for tax evasion are high-net-worth individuals and have the resources to
hire lawyers to mount a defense not necessarily available to the average
taxpayer. Applying the mass-media approach in such circumstances
requires the IRS to weigh the advantages of the cases before it. Under
the Code, however, attorney's fees can be awarded to the prevailing
party in tax litigation.'" And although the award is limited by what is
"reasonable," the government has recovered significant attorney's fees in
the past.' 9' In addition, the fines imposed by the courts in successful tax
evasion prosecutions should be considered in offsetting the increased
cost of litigation. For instance, in 1989, Leona Helmsley was ordered to
186. See Johnston, supra note 184; Zimmerman, supra note 185.
187. Mr. Snipes was found not guilty of felony tax fraud under section 7201 of the I.R.C. See
Johnston, supra note 184. He was found guilty of failing to file a tax return under section 7203 of the
I.R.C, a misdemeanor statue. See id. Both are criminal statutes that require proof that an individual
was required to file a return and willfully failed to do so. The details of the differences between the
two are irrelevant for this discussion. The important point is that regardless of his acquittal, Mr. Snipes
was found guilty of tax evasion under the general definition of the term, i.e., failure to report income
subject to tax liability.
188. See supra notes 165, I69, 172, 184, 185.
I89. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney Robert E. O'Neill, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Wesley Snipes
Sentenced to Three Years Imprisonment (Apr. 24, 2oo8), availableat www.usdoj.govlusaolflmlpr2oo8/
April/2oo8o424-SnipesKahnRosile-OcTaxSent.pdf.
19o. I.R.C. § 7430 (2006).
191. In the Wesley Snipes case, the government was awarded attorney fees and costs totaling
about $217,ooo. Associated Press, Judge: Snipes Must Reimburse Government, USA TODAY, Aug. 5,
2008, http://www.usatoday.comllife/people/2oo8-o8-o5-snipes-_N.htm.
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pay $7.1 million in fines in addition to the $1.7 million she owed in
evaded taxes.'92 By referring cases with a higher likelihood of success, the
IRS can manage the risk of increased cost of prosecution.
Finally, as discussed above, some individuals will simply never
choose to comply and will have to be prosecuted before fulfilling their
tax obligations.'93 Tax protestors will likely not be influenced by social
values, norms, or other nonpecuniary sanctions. Even facing
nonpecuniary sanctions, individuals such as Wesley Snipes, Eddie Kay
Kahn, and Douglas Rosile'94 will choose to present costly defenses rather
than simply pay their tax obligations. Although this cannot be considered
the norm,'95 part of the tax gap is certainly comprised of such strategic
noncompliers who will never voluntarily comply and who will comply
involuntarily only after caught. The mass-media solution targets only the
marginal taxpayers, who are subject to influence because they have no
strong ideological objection to cooperation and evade only occasionally
when the opportunity presents itself.
The creation and reinforcement of "good" norms is a process that
occurs over time. To reinforce norms, the IRS must be vigilant in
continuing to send messages to the taxpaying public that evasion is bad
and that the satisfaction of tax obligations is good. Beyond that, the
creation of norms is a slow process. Through mass media, the public is
faced with common social values. Embedding these values into the
individual's sense of self and sense of community creates social norms.
But doing so takes time. Telling someone that smoking cigarettes is bad
will initially be met with resistance. Creation of a norm occurs only after
a lengthy campaign to influence behavior through the dissemination of
information and the eventual acceptance of specific values. The massmedia approach is therefore limited in its immediate efficacy and its
ability to respond to changes in IRS compliance goals.
CONCLUSION

The issue of voluntary compliance is essential to any discussion of
methods of closing the tax gap. Because of the size and scope of the
American tax system, performing individual audits on even a majority of
income tax returns is not feasible. Therefore, approaches to reducing the
tax gap are more effectively focused on encouraging taxpayers to want to

192. Enid Nemy, Leona Helmsley, Hotel 'Queen,' is Dead at 87, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21 2007,
available at http://topics.nytimes.cOl2oo7/o8/2i/nyregion/2 helmsley.html?pagewanted= i.
193. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
194. Mr. Kahn and Mr. Rosile were co-defendants in the Snipes trial. See U.S. v. Wesley Snipes,
supra note 16I.
195. In 2001, the IRS collected approximately $5o billion in back taxes and corrected returns.
OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 3, at 13. This suggests a relatively high rate of post-audit success in
collection.
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honestly and completely report their income. As a supplement to actual
legal punishment, influencing social norms and values can be a valuable
tool in combating noncompliant behavior and improving compliance
among marginal taxpayers. The mass-media approach focuses on the use
of mass media to publicize the prosecution of high-profile individuals as
a way to change attitudes and behavior. To the extent that mass media
and advertising have a lasting effect on behavior, presenting an
appropriate campaign for voluntary compliance can have lasting effects
on norms of behavior. Because it is limited in scope, however, the massmedia approach can only be viewed as a supplement to alternative and
more traditional methods of encouraging compliance. Increased audits,
increased punishment, simplification of the Code, and better customer
services are therefore all still relevant considerations in creating a
symbiotic approach to tax compliance.
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